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Our paper investigates spillover effects across different business segments of publicly traded financial con-glomerates. We find that the investment decisions of mutual fund shareholders do not depend only on the
prior performance of the mutual funds; they also depend on the prior performance of the funds’ management
companies. Flows into equity and bond mutual funds increase with the prior stock price performance of the
funds’ management companies after controlling for fund performance and other fund characteristics. The sen-
sitivity of flows to the management company’s performance is not justified by the subsequent performance of
the affiliated funds. The results indicate that the reputation of a company’s brand has a significant impact on
the behavior of its customers.
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1. Introduction
Mutual funds are often managed by diversified finan-
cial conglomerates that are also active in other busi-
ness segments, such as banking and insurance. Such
diversified companies can exhibit spillovers across the
various business segments, because the performance
of the nonmutual fund segments can have an impact
on the mutual fund segments. Our paper investigates
whether the prior stock price performance of the man-
agement company is related to the money flows and
the performance of its affiliated mutual funds.
Whereas the impact of prior fund performance on
fund flows has received substantial attention in the
mutual fund literature (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison
1997, Sirri and Tufano 1998, Huang et al. 2007),
no papers have studied the impact of the perfor-
mance of the management company on mutual fund
flows. Fund investors might consider the prior com-
pany performance in addition to the prior fund
performance because the company’s performance
might be informative about the future performance
of the affiliated mutual funds. For example, poorly
performing fund management companies might be
financially constrained and might reduce the allo-
cation of resources to their affiliated mutual funds.
In addition, they might also struggle to retain and
hire qualified fund managers. Thus, fund investors
might expect the subsequent fund performance to
be positively related to the prior performance of
the fund management company. In this case, one
should observe superior subsequent performance for
funds affiliated with successful fund management
companies.
On the other hand, mutual fund investors might
mistakenly associate the stock price performance of
the management company with the performance of
the mutual funds and consequently overestimate the
impact of the management company’s performance
on its mutual fund segment. In this case, one should
not observe superior subsequent performance for
funds affiliated with successful fund management
companies. In fact, the performance of the affili-
ated mutual funds might even decline with the man-
agement company’s performance if there are disec-
onomies of scale in asset management as postulated
by Berk and Green (2004).
To investigate the relation between the stock price
performance of management companies and the
money flows of their affiliated mutual funds, we col-
lect a sample of 109 publicly traded companies that
manage mutual funds over the period from 1992 to
2009. Whereas some companies focus their activi-
ties on mutual fund management, most companies
derive only a small fraction of their revenues from
their mutual fund segments. Comparing the spillover
effects between firms with differential dependence on
the mutual fund segment enables us to study in more
depth the economic reasons for the spillover effects.
Our main result shows that the prior performance
of the management company plays an important role
in explaining mutual fund flows. For example, equity
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funds affiliated with fund companies in the top per-
formance decile over the prior 24 months increase
their assets under management in the subsequent
month by 0.55%. On the other hand, equity funds
from companies in the bottom performance decile
decrease their assets by 0.34% in the subsequent
month. The importance of company performance as
a predictor of fund flows is robust after controlling
for prior fund performance and other fund and fam-
ily characteristics, such as risk, size, age, expenses,
advertising expenditures, employment growth, and
the detection of mutual fund scandals.
We study the money flows of both equity and bond
mutual funds. The impact of the stock price perfor-
mance of the management company on the money
flows for bond mutual funds is similar to that for
equity funds. For example, bond funds affiliated with
fund companies in the top performance decile over
the prior 24 months increase their assets under man-
agement in the subsequent month by 0.58%, whereas
bond funds from companies in the bottom decile
increase their assets by just 0.08% in the subsequent
month. Finding consistent results for both bond and
equity mutual funds strengthens our confidence that
the results are robust and are not driven by equity-
specific fundamental factors.
The relation between company performance and
fund flows could simply occur because the company
performance reflects the performance of the mutual
fund segment. Companies that manage successful
mutual funds might exhibit superior stock price per-
formance because the stock price capitalizes the value
of the mutual fund sector to the financial conglom-
erate. This direct spillover effect should be particu-
larly pronounced for management companies where
the mutual fund segment accounts for a large frac-
tion of the company’s revenues. Despite substantial
cross-sectional differences in the relative size of the
mutual fund segment, we do not find any signifi-
cant differences between the sensitivity of fund flows
to company performance for companies with below-
and above-median revenue percentages. This result
indicates that the relation between flows and com-
pany returns is primarily driven by indirect spillover
effects and is unlikely to simply reflect the superior
performance of the mutual funds.
To investigate in more depth the economic reasons
of the spillover effects, we study whether the effects
differ across mutual funds. In the first subsample,
we separate mutual funds according to whether the
mutual fund name includes the name of the mutual
fund management company. Many fund investors
might not recognize the affiliation between the fund
management company and the mutual funds if they
do not share the same names. We only observe a sig-
nificant relation between company performance and
fund flows for funds that share the name of the man-
agement company. The second subsample separates
funds according to whether the funds have a low or
high name fluency score based on Green and Jame
(2013). We only find spillover effects for funds with
short, easy-to-pronounce names. These results indi-
cate that our findings are more likely driven by repu-
tational or brand spillovers and less likely driven by
the rational learning of the investment ability of fund
managers.
Our final question addresses whether the response
of fund investors to the company performance is jus-
tified. The flow response would be justified if the
prior company performance enables fund investors
to make superior investment decisions. Whereas we
do find a positive relation between past fund per-
formance and future fund performance, we do not
find a positive relation between past company perfor-
mance and future fund performance. Indeed, the rela-
tion between future fund returns and prior company
performance is significantly negative at longer-term
horizons. Thus, our performance results do not pro-
vide a justification for the positive relation between
fund flows and prior company performance.
There is a large literature that investigates the
impact of mutual fund performance on money
flows.1 Our paper is the first to provide evidence
that the performance of the management company
also has an economically and statistically significant
impact on fund flows. Consistent with the umbrella
branding literature, we provide evidence for repu-
tational spillover effects between products that are
cobranded.2
Several recent papers have studied the implications
of family affiliation and the ownership of the mutual
fund families. This literature has investigated invest-
ment strategies, risk taking, and incentives in fami-
lies.3 Our paper also contributes to this literature by
studying the relation between past performance of the
management company and the future money flows
in mutual funds. Although the mutual fund litera-
ture has studied spillover effects within mutual fund
1 Papers on mutual fund flows and fund performance include
Brown et al. (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano
(1998), Zheng (1999), Del Guercio and Tkac (2002, 2008), Lynch and
Musto (2003), Berk and Green (2004), Nanda et al. (2004), Huang
et al. (2007, 2012), Ivkovich and Weisbenner (2009), Chapman et al.
(2010), Spiegel and Zhang (2013), Pastor et al. (2014), Berk and
Van Binsbergen (2015), and Sialm et al. (2015).
2 See Wernerfelt (1988), Erdem (1998), and Erdem and Sun (2002)
for influential papers on umbrella branding.
3 Papers in this literature include Khorana and Servaes (1999),
Massa (2003), Chen et al. (2004), Nanda et al. (2004), Gaspar et al.
(2006), Gervais et al. (2006), Ivkovich (2006), Reuter (2006), Cohen
et al. (2008), Kempf and Ruenzi (2008), Massa and Rehman (2008),
Evans (2010), Gallaher et al. (2010), Bhattacharya et al. (2013), Chen
et al. (2013), and Ferreira et al. (2014).
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families, our paper studies spillover effects between
the mutual fund segments of diversified financial con-
glomerates and other divisions.
2. Data and Summary Statistics
In this section, we describe the sample construction
and report some key summary statistics.
2.1. Sample Construction
The data on mutual funds are obtained from the
survivorship bias-free mutual fund database pro-
vided by the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP). We focus on the period between January
1992 and December 2009, for which management
company information is available. The first sample
includes all diversified U.S. equity funds. Our base
sample excludes balanced funds, index funds, inter-
national funds, and sector funds.4 The second sample
includes all taxable U.S. government and corporate
bond funds. We exclude index funds, money mar-
ket funds, and municipal bond funds.5 We aggregate
the different share classes of a fund using MFLINKS
based on Wermers (2000) and using the fund names
for funds not listed in the MFLINKS database.
Our sample funds must further satisfy the fol-
lowing criteria: First, the management company is
publicly traded or a subsidiary of a publicly traded
company. Second, the funds must have nonmissing
management company names; nonmissing monthly
total net assets; nonmissing turnover, expense ratios,
and loads; and nonmissing Lipper investment objec-
tive codes. Third, the funds must have at least
36 months of nonmissing returns. Fourth, the funds
must have total net assets above $5 million at the
beginning of each month.
From the CRSP mutual fund database, we obtain
the names of management companies and their cor-
responding management codes. Using these names,
we manually search through the CRSP stock database
to find the CUSIPs of the common stocks of man-
agement companies that are publicly traded. To take
into account mergers affecting management compa-
nies or their parents, we extract a list of mergers
from the SDC Platinum database and assign the funds
to the merged companies after the effective date of
the mergers. The exact merger dates are verified
using Edgar, Factiva, or Google. Using the matched
4 Funds with Lipper objective codes EI, EIEI, ELCC, G, GI, LCCE,
LCGE, LCVE, MC, MCCE, MCGE, MCVE, MLCE, MLGE, MLVE,
MR, SCCE, SCGE, SCVE, and SG are retained as equity funds.
5 Bond funds with Lipper objective codes A, BBB, GB, GUT, GUS,
HY, IID, IUG, MSI, SID, SII, SIU, SUS, SUT, and USM are retained.
We also exclude bond funds with more than 50% holdings in equity
securities.
CUSIPs, we obtain monthly stock returns of manage-
ment companies or their publicly traded parent com-
panies (if the management company is a subsidiary)
from the stock files provided by CRSP.
We use Compustat to obtain annual revenues of
the management company and the CRSP mutual fund
database to obtain management fees for each fund,
which allows us to compute the dependency of the
management company on revenues generated by its
fund management segment.
Overall, our mutual fund sample includes 1,224
equity funds and 1,128 bond funds after applying
our selection criteria. The mutual funds are affiliated
with 109 publicly traded fund management compa-
nies. These publicly traded fund families account for
36.8% of the assets under management in the mutual
fund sector.6
2.2. Summary Statistics
This section explains the construction of the variables
used in our study and reports some key summary
statistics.
2.2.1. Management Company Performance. We
measure the performance of a management company
using the market-adjusted stock returns (CR) over the
past 12, 24, and 36 months, respectively. The market-
adjusted return is obtained by subtracting the value-
weighted stock market return obtained from CRSP
from the stock return of the management company.
Investors are more likely to react to persistent, rather
than transient, management company performance,
so a 36-month time horizon allows us to better cap-
ture the longer-term performance of a firm. However,
a 12-month performance enables us to examine the
shorter-term sensitivity of investors to management
company performance.
Panel A of Table 1 reports the characteristics of
companies that offer equity mutual funds.7 The aver-
age management company in our equity sample
experiences an average market-adjusted return of
0.69% per month over the prior 24 months. The
publicly traded companies in the sample exhibit sig-
nificant variation in their average monthly perfor-
mance, as reflected by the standard deviation of
6 The sample of publicly traded fund management companies
might not be a random sample of management companies and
might be more subject to agency problems, as discussed by Ferris
and Yan (2009). For example, our sample excludes funds offered
by Fidelity and Vanguard since these fund families are not pub-
licly traded. Examples of fund management companies included in
our sample are ABN AMRO, Allianz, Bank of New York, Chase,
Dreyfus, J. P. Morgan, Janus, Metlife, Morgan Stanley, Prudential,
T. Rowe Price, and UBS.
7 The characteristics of management companies differ slightly
across the equity and the bond samples because not all manage-
ment companies offer both bond and equity funds over all time
periods.
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Table 1 Summary Statistics of Mutual Funds
Variables Mean Std. dev. 25th perc. Median 75th perc.
Panel A: Fund management companies
CR (Market-adjusted returns, 24 months, in %) 0069 1080 −0026 0058 1049
Std.Dev.CR (24 months, in %) 7056 3079 4078 6060 9030
REVPCT Equity Funds (Revenue share, in %) 4088 11064 0018 0051 4074
REVPCT Bond Funds (Revenue share, in %) 3012 8070 0009 0035 3007
AI (Advertising intensity, 24 months, in %) 0083 1083 0000 0000 1011
EG (Employment growth, 24 months, in %) 6060 12058 −1033 3044 11014
SG (Sales growth, 24 months, in %) 13033 17073 2008 10065 21018
ROE (Return on equity, 24 months, in %) 20015 39046 12085 18014 24004
SCANDAL (Indicator for 6 months postscandal, in %) 0096 9073 0000 0000 0000
Panel B: Equity mutual funds
NMG (New money growth, in %) 0010 5001 −1035 −0014 1072
FR (Market-adjusted returns, 24 months, in %) −0000 0070 −0034 −0007 0026
Std.Dev.FR (24 months, in %) 2019 1050 1018 1079 2069
TNA (Total net assets, in $M) 695021 11194036 66080 214070 690080
AGE (in months) 120082 132022 41000 81065 141034
TO (Turnover, in %) 84051 113044 36000 65063 109000
EXP (Expense ratio, in %) 1021 0044 0095 1017 1048
LOAD (Total loads, in %) 2026 1099 0030 1094 3092
STAR (Star fund, 24 months) 6053 24070 0000 0000 0000
FLUENCY (Fund fluency score, 60147) 2001 0078 2000 2000 2000
Panel C: Bond mutual funds
NMG (New money growth, in %) 0058 4070 −1051 −0024 1053
FR (Market-adjusted returns, 24 months, in %) −0010 0093 −0021 −0005 0017
Std.Dev.FR (24 months, in %) 1090 1094 0039 1000 2092
TNA (Total net assets, in $M) 648012 999095 89090 245010 703000
AGE (in months) 130027 125003 53013 100002 161043
TO (Turnover, in %) 138007 188063 44000 80099 156000
EXP (Expense ratio, in %) 0094 0042 0066 0088 1016
LOAD (Total loads, in %) 1034 1081 0000 0019 205
STAR (Star fund, 24 months, in %) 5018 22016 0000 0000 0000
Notes. This table presents summary statistics for both equity and bond funds. The sample period is from January 1992 to December 2009.
average market-adjusted returns of 1.80%. The aver-
age time-series standard deviation of the monthly
market-adjusted returns over the prior 24 months
(Std.Dev.CR) equals 7.56%.
To obtain an impression of the importance of the
mutual fund revenues relative to the total revenues of
management companies, we compute for each fund
in each year the dollar amount of management fees
as the product of the annual management fees listed
in the CRSP mutual fund database and the average of
the total monthly net assets over the past 12 months.
Using annual revenues obtained from Compustat, we
sum the dollar management fees across all member
funds under the same management company and
divide by the company’s annual revenue to obtain
the revenue percentage (REVPCT).8 Mutual funds
account for a relatively small fraction of the rev-
enues for most management companies. The man-
agement fees of equity (bond) mutual funds amount
8 Our results are not affected qualitatively if we use the expense
ratio instead of management fees as a proxy for the fund revenues
instead. However, the expense ratio might include revenues that
do not accrue to the management company.
on average to only 4.88% (3.12%) of the revenues of
the management companies. Half of our management
companies have management fees from equity (bond)
mutual funds that are below 0.51% (0.35%) of their
total revenues. In some of our analyses, we focus on
the companies with below-median mutual fund rev-
enue dependencies to be able to distinguish between
direct and indirect spillover effects.
We use several additional accounting variables
based on annual Compustat data. Advertising inten-
sity (AI) is defined as the ratio between advertising
expenditures and net sales over the prior year. The
mean advertising intensity equals 0.83%. To capture
the growth rate of the corporations, we compute the
employment growth (EG) and the sales growth (SG)
over the prior year. Finally, the return on equity (ROE)
captures the profitability of a company. We winsorize
the accounting variables at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels
to remove the influence of outliers.
Since fund investors might withdraw money from
their mutual funds in response to corporate scandals,
we define an indicator variable for mutual fund scan-
dals (SCANDAL) that equals one if a fund manage-
ment company had an announcement of a scandal
Sialm and Tham: Spillover Effects in Mutual Fund Companies
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over the prior six months. We obtain our list of scan-
dals from Houge and Wellman (2005). We construct
this variable over the years from 2000 to 2009 since
the mutual fund scandals occur during this subpe-
riod. We find that slightly less than 1% of our obser-
vations in this subperiod are affected by mutual fund
scandals.
2.2.2. Mutual Fund Variables. The monthly
money flow into each family is defined as the dollar
change in the monthly total net asset value (TNA)
minus the price appreciation of family assets over the
month (R). Assuming that new money is invested at
the end of each month, the new money growth rate
(NMG) into fund f in month t is defined as
NMGf 1 t =
TNAf 1 t −TNAf 1 t−141 +Rf 1 t5
TNAf 1 t−141 +Rf 1 t5
1 (1)
where Rf 1 t is the investor return of fund f and TNAf 1 t
is the total net asset value of fund f . We normalize the
dollar flows by the appreciated lagged TNA to ensure
that the flows never fall below −100%.9
Panel B of Table 1 summarizes the results for the
equity fund sample and panel C summarizes the
results for the bond fund sample. To remove out-
liers, we winsorize NMG at the 1% and 99% levels.
The mean equity (bond) mutual fund experiences an
inflow of 0.10% (0.58%) per month.
We compute the market-adjusted fund return (FR)
relative to the CRSP value-weighted market index for
equity funds and relative to the U.S. Aggregate Bond
Index from Barclays for bond funds.10 The perfor-
mance differs significantly across funds. The interquar-
tile range of the mean market-adjusted return over
the prior 24 months equals 6−0034%10026%7 for equity
funds and 6−0021%10017%7 for bond funds. To cap-
ture the variation of fund returns, we define the time-
series standard deviation of the market-adjusted fund
returns over the prior 24 months (Std.Dev.FR).
Following extant studies, we also control for the
size, the age, the turnover ratio, the expense ratio,
the total loads, and the name fluency score of funds.
The loads are defined as the sum of the maximum
front- and back-end loads. We follow Nanda et al.
(2004) in constructing an indicator variable (STAR)
that equals one if a fund obtained a five-star rating
from Morningstar. The average sizes of the equity and
bond funds equal $695 and $648 million, respectively.
Equity and bond funds have average ages of 121
and 130 months, respectively. Equity (bond) mutual
9 The introduction of new funds does not affect our flows since we
require that funds have 36 months of prior returns before including
these funds in our sample.
10 We thank Barclays for providing us with the monthly total returns
of the U.S. Aggregate Bond Index.
funds have an average turnover of approximately
85% (138%) and on average charge expense ratios
of 1.21% (0.94%) and total loads of 2.26% (1.34%).
Approximately 6.53% of equity funds and 5.18% of
bond funds are classified as star funds.
The fluency score for the names of mutual funds
is based on Green and Jame (2013).11 They define
fund name fluency as the sum of its length score, its
Englishness score, and its dictionary score.12 Equity
mutual funds have a mean fund fluency score of 2.01
with a standard deviation of 0.78.
3. Mutual Fund Flows
In this section, we analyze whether the performance
of the management company affects the flows into
equity and bond mutual funds. Individual investors
might avoid holding mutual funds affiliated with
companies that performed poorly. On the other hand,
funds affiliated with management companies with a
good reputation might benefit. Since the performance
of the management company might reflect the perfor-
mance of its mutual funds, it is important to control
for the performance of the funds. In addition, we also
study subsamples of management companies where
the mutual funds account for a very small portion of
the overall revenues of the publicly traded firms.
3.1. Univariate Relation
To obtain a first impression of the relation between
firm performance and mutual fund flows, we sort
management companies monthly into deciles accord-
ing to their market-adjusted performance over the
prior 24 months. Panels A and B of Figure 1 depict the
new money growth rates over the subsequent month
of equity and bond funds managed by companies in
different performance deciles.
Our main result shows that the prior management
company performance plays an important role in
explaining mutual fund flows. Equity funds affiliated
with fund companies in the top market-adjusted per-
formance decile over the prior 24 months increase
their assets under management in the subsequent
month by 0.55%. On the other hand, equity funds
from companies in the bottom decile lower their
11 We thank Clifton Green and Russell Jame for sharing their fund
name fluency scores with us.
12 Green and Jame (2013) assign funds with name lengths below
the 25th percentile (three words) a length score of 3, funds with
name lengths between the 25th and 75th percentile (four words) a
length score of 2, and funds with name lengths greater than the
75th percentile a length score of 1. Funds in the bottom quintile of
Englishness as defined by Travers and Olivier (1978) are given an
Englishness score of 0, and all other funds are given an English-
ness score of 1. For the dictionary score, they assign a dictionary
score of 1 if the proportion of dictionary words in the fund name
is greater than the median and 0 otherwise.
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Figure 1 Money Flows to Mutual Funds by Management Company
Performance
Panel A: Equity funds
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Notes. These figures depict the relation between management company per-
formance deciles and new money growth for equity and bond funds, where
the market-adjusted management company performance is measured over
the prior 24 months. New money growth is expressed in percent per month.
assets under management by 0.34% in the subse-
quent month. The relation for the 24-month horizon
is almost monotonic, resulting in a Spearman rank
correlation of 0.96, which is statistically significant
(p = 0000001). The relation is similar for the 12- and
36-month horizons, which are not depicted separately.
The differences in flows between top and bottom
decile management companies are statistically signif-
icant at a 1% level over all three horizons.
The univariate relation between firm performance
and bond fund flows is reported in panel B of Fig-
ure 1. Consistent with the equity fund results, we find
that the flows into bond funds are positively related
to the prior performance of the affiliated management
company. Whereas bond funds affiliated with man-
agement companies in the lowest company perfor-
mance decile using a 24-month window experience
inflows of 0.08% per month, funds in the highest
company performance decile experience inflows of
0.58% per month. The Spearman rank correlation for
the 24-month horizon equals 0.88, which is statisti-
cally significant at a 1% level (p = 0000081). The rela-
tion is similar for the 12- and 36-month horizons.
Since the prior company performance is measured
over a relatively long time period, the composition
of the decile portfolios remains relatively stable over
time, and the fund flows persist over extended time
periods. These results indicate that company perfor-
mance has a significant impact on fund flows.
3.2. Bivariate Relation
To investigate whether the results are robust after
controlling for fund performance, we double-sort
funds monthly into quartiles according to the market-
adjusted return of their management company over
the prior 24 months and into quartiles according
to the market-adjusted fund return over the prior
24 months. The two-dimensional sorts are performed
independently of each other. Panel A of Table 2
reports the results for the equity funds, and panel B
reports the results for the bond funds. The rows cor-
respond to the management company performance
quartiles, and the columns correspond to the fund
performance quartiles. The standard errors are clus-
tered by management company.
We find that funds of management companies
with superior stock price performance attract signifi-
cantly higher flows even after controlling for the fund
performance quartiles. Fund flows of top-quartile
management companies exceed the flows of bottom
quartile management companies for all fund perfor-
mance quartiles by between 0.11 and 0.45 percentage
points per month for equity funds and by between
0.63 and 0.99 percentage points per month for bond
funds. The differences in flows between top- and
bottom-quartile management companies are statisti-
cally significant at the 5% level for all fund perfor-
mance quartiles except one.13
Consistent with Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri
and Tufano (1998), and Huang et al. (2007), we find
that funds with superior prior fund performance
exhibit higher net flows. For example, the differ-
ences in monthly flows between the top and the bot-
tom prior performance quartiles equal 2.62 percentage
points per month for equity funds and 0.76 percent-
age points per month for bond funds.
These double-sort results demonstrate that fund
and company returns capture different performance
aspects. Furthermore, the fact that the prior perfor-
mance of the equity securities of the management
13 By sorting the funds into quartiles according to their prior fund
performance, we already control for the variation of contempora-
neous fund performance across the four fund performance groups.
To study whether there is additional variation in fund performance
within the four groups, we also compute the average prior fund
returns. We find little additional variation in the fund performance
within the four FR quartiles. The results are not affected qualita-
tively if we measure the prior company and fund performance over
a 12- or a 36-month horizon.
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Table 2 Equity Fund Flows by Management Company Performance (CR) and Equity Fund Performance (FR)
ALL FR 1 FR 2 FR 3 FR 4 4-1
Panel A: Equity funds
ALL −1004∗∗∗ −0027∗∗∗ 0048∗∗∗ 1058∗∗∗ 2062∗∗∗
400075 400065 400065 400095 400105
CR 1 −0013∗∗ −1025∗∗∗ −0037∗∗∗ 0020∗∗∗ 1033∗∗∗ 2058∗∗∗
400065 400085 00075 400085 400145 400165
CR 2 0018∗∗∗ −1011∗∗∗ −0022∗∗∗ 0051∗∗∗ 1063∗∗∗ 2074∗∗∗
400065 400085 400085 400075 400105 400115
CR 3 0024∗∗∗ −0087∗∗∗ −0023∗∗∗ 0057∗∗∗ 1057∗∗∗ 2044∗∗∗
400055 400085 400085 400085 400115 400115
CR 4 0046∗∗∗ −0088∗∗∗ −0026∗∗∗ 0065∗∗∗ 1072∗∗∗ 2060∗∗∗
400075 400095 400085 400095 400135 400145
4-1 0059∗∗∗ 0037∗∗∗ 0011 0045∗∗∗ 0039∗∗
400085 400105 400095 400115 400175
Panel B: Bond funds
ALL −0038∗∗∗ −0006 0028∗∗∗ 0038∗∗∗ 0076∗∗∗
400105 400095 400075 400085 400115
CR 1 −0038∗∗∗ −0072∗∗∗ −0032∗∗∗ −0027∗∗∗ −0007 0064∗∗∗
400085 400165 400115 400105 400105 400175
CR 2 −0009 −0044∗∗∗ −0026∗∗∗ 0014∗ 0012 0056∗∗∗
400065 400125 400095 400085 400095 400135
CR 3 0024∗∗∗ −0022∗∗ 0003 0051∗∗∗ 0053∗∗∗ 0075∗∗∗
400055 400095 400095 400085 400085 400125
CR 4 0045∗∗∗ −0005 0031∗∗∗ 0072∗∗∗ 0092∗∗∗ 0097∗∗∗
400075 400115 400115 400105 400125 400155
4-1 0083∗∗∗ 0067∗∗∗ 0063∗∗∗ 0099∗∗∗ 0099∗∗∗
400085 400155 400125 400115 400125
Notes. The table independently sorts mutual funds into quartiles by the market-adjusted stock returns of their management company
(CR ) and by their market-adjusted fund return (FR ) over the prior 24 months. Panels A and B summarize the mean new money growth
rates in the subsequent month based on the fund and company performance for equity and bond funds. The fund flows are computed
for each group as the average percentage new money growth rates (NMG). The sample period ranges from January 1992 to December
2009. The standard errors of the differences are clustered by management company and are shown in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
company predicts future flows of both equity and
bond funds indicates that the results are not driven
by equity-specific fundamental factors.
3.3. Multivariate Regressions
To explore in more depth the impact of the company’s
performance on fund flows, we employ multivari-
ate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions including
time fixed effects:
NMGf 1 t = 1CRf 1 t−1 +2FRf 1 t−1 +3FAMFRf 1 t−1
+4STARf 1 t−1 +5Std0Dev0CRf 1 t−1
+6Std0Dev0FRf 1 t−1 +7LOG4TNAf 1 t−15
+8LOG4AGEf 1 t−15+9TOf 1 t−1
+10EXPf 1 t−1 +11LOADf 1 t−1
+t + f 1 t1 (2)
where CR is the prior performance of the manage-
ment company of mutual fund f , FR is the prior per-
formance of fund f , FAMFR is the value-weighted
prior performance of the other mutual funds in the
same fund family as fund f , and STAR is an indica-
tor variable that measures whether the fund is a star
fund. The company and fund performance measures
are defined as the average market-adjusted returns
of the stock prices of the management companies
and of the average market-adjusted net fund returns
over the prior 12, 24, and 36 months. Std0Dev0CR and
Std0Dev0FR are the time-series standard deviations of
CR and FR, respectively. TNA is the total net assets
of fund f , AGE is the fund age in months, TO is
the portfolio turnover, EXP is the expense ratio, and
LOAD is the maximum total load. We cluster the stan-
dard errors by management company. We expect 1
to be positive if the stock performance of the man-
agement company attracts flows into the fund family
after controlling for fund performance and other fund
characteristics.
Table 3 reports the coefficient estimates using dif-
ferent return horizons. The first three columns cor-
respond to equity funds. We find a positive relation
between prior company performance and subsequent
equity fund flows regardless of the return hori-
zon. The relation between company performance and
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Table 3 Fund Flows by Management Company Performance
Dependent variable: Monthly fund flows (NMG)
Equity funds Bond funds
12 months 24 months 36 months 12 months 24 months 36 months
CR 00052∗∗ 00083∗∗ 00087∗ 00024 00062∗ 00070∗
4000245 4000425 4000525 4000225 4000355 4000425
FR 00986∗∗∗ 10244∗∗∗ 10260∗∗∗ 00644∗∗∗ 00883∗∗∗ 00918∗∗∗
4000505 4000855 4001105 4000575 4000775 4001005
FAMFR −00098 −00111 −00185 00071 00155 00168
4000875 4001385 4001635 4001245 4001395 4001585
STAR 00011∗∗∗ 00012∗∗∗ 00010∗∗∗ 00013∗∗∗ 00013∗∗∗ 00015∗∗∗
4000025 4000025 4000025 4000025 4000025 4000025
Std.Dev.CR 00005 00019 00020 00012 00022 00024
4000135 4000185 4000225 4000125 4000165 4000175
Std.Dev.FR −00048∗ −00107∗∗∗ −00150∗∗∗ −00070∗∗ −00084∗∗∗ −00128∗∗∗
4000265 4000285 4000305 4000305 4000325 4000315
LOG(TNA) 00000 −00001 −00001∗∗ 00000 00000 00000
4000005 4000005 4000005 4000005 4000005 4000005
LOG(AGE) −00009∗∗∗ −00008∗∗∗ −00008∗∗∗ −00008∗∗∗ −00008∗∗∗ −00008∗∗∗
4000015 4000015 4000015 4000015 4000015 4000015
TO −00001∗∗ −00001∗ −00001∗ 00000 00000 00000
4000015 4000015 4000015 4000005 4000005 4000005
EXP −00324∗∗ −00306∗∗ −00293∗∗ −00293∗∗ −00283∗∗ −00259∗
4001445 4001375 4001395 4001455 4001425 4001445
LOAD 00091∗∗∗ 00083∗∗∗ 00082∗∗∗ 00062∗∗ 00056∗ 00052∗
4000285 4000265 4000275 4000315 4000305 4000305
Observations 78,061 78,061 78,061 83,799 83,799 83,799
R-squared 00126 00126 00113 00067 00066 00064
Notes. This table uses OLS regressions to examine the relation between stock performance of management companies and fund flows into diversified U.S.
equity and bond funds managed by these companies. The dependent variable is fund-level new money growth (NMG) in month t . The stock price performance
of management companies is measured using the average market-adjusted returns over the prior 12, 24, and 36 months (CR ). FR and FAMFR are the average
market-adjusted fund and fund family returns over the prior 12, 24, and 36 months. STAR is an indicator variable that takes on unity if the fund is rated as a
star fund. Std 0Dev 0CR and Std 0Dev 0FR are the time-series standard deviations of CR and FR , respectively. TNA is the total net asset value of a fund. AGE is
the fund age. TO is the turnover ratio of a fund. EXP and LOAD are the expense ratio and the total load of a fund. The sample period is from January 1992 to
December 2009. Time fixed effects are included. All independent variables are lagged by one month. Standard errors are clustered by management companies
and are reported in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
subsequent fund flows is also economically signifi-
cant. For example, a one-standard-deviation increase
in the performance of the management company dur-
ing the prior 24 months (which amounts to 1.80%)
increases the flows into equity funds in the subse-
quent month by 0.15 percentage points, using the
coefficient estimates from the 24-month horizon.
Consistent with the bivariate analysis in Table 2,
we find that fund flows are strongly positively related
with the prior fund performance. For example, a
one-standard-deviation increase in the performance of
the mutual fund during the prior 24 months (which
amounts to 0.70%) increases the flows into equity
funds in the subsequent month by 0.87 percentage
points. Additional fund characteristics are also related
to the flows of equity funds, although the economic
significance of these variables is generally lower than
the performance-based variables. For example, equity
fund flows decline with the volatility of fund returns,
fund age, and fund turnover. Furthermore, fund flows
are negatively related to fund expenses and positively
related to fund loads. Loads might have a different
impact on fund flows than expenses, because loads
are often used to compensate financial brokers for
helping individual investors to select mutual funds,
as discussed by Bergstresser et al. (2009) and Christof-
fersen et al. (2013).
The last three columns of Table 3 show that the per-
formance of the management company over the prior
24 and 36 months also has a positive impact on the
subsequent flows into bond mutual funds. The mag-
nitude and the statistical significance of the effects is
slightly reduced for bond funds compared to equity
funds.
In unreported results, we show that the results are
not sensitive to whether we measure the performance
of the management company relative to their industry
peers or a four-factor benchmark model. The results
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Table 4 Family-Level Fund Flows by Management Company Performance
Dependent variable: Monthly fund family flows (NMG)
Equity funds Bond funds
12 months 24 months 36 months 12 months 24 months 36 months
CR 00049 00111∗∗ 00120∗∗ 00005 00061∗ 00072∗∗
4000355 4000545 4000525 4000235 4000365 4000335
FR 00371∗∗∗ 00710∗∗∗ 00737∗∗∗ 00488∗∗∗ 00652∗∗∗ 00690∗∗∗
4000575 4001885 4002335 4001195 4001665 4001865
STAR 00005∗∗∗ 00006∗∗∗ 00006∗∗∗ 00003∗∗∗ 00004∗∗∗ 00004∗∗∗
4000025 4000015 4000015 4000015 4000015 4000015
Std.Dev.CR 00024 00037 00057 00021 00024 00026
4000215 4000305 4000405 4000185 4000225 4000225
Std.Dev.FR −00040 −00070 −00069 −00041 −00085 −00116∗
4000505 4000565 4000615 4000585 4000635 4000685
LOG(TNA) 00001∗ 00001 00000 00001 00000 00000
4000005 4000005 4000015 4000005 4000005 4000005
LOG(AGE) −00005∗∗∗ −00004∗∗∗ −00004∗∗∗ −00004∗∗∗ −00004∗∗∗ −00004∗∗∗
4000015 4000015 4000015 4000015 4000015 4000015
TO −00003∗ −00003∗ −00003∗∗ 00001 00001 00001
4000025 4000015 4000015 4000015 4000015 4000015
EXP −00004 −00022 −00043 −00167 −00174 −00177
4002595 4002485 4002535 4002735 4002785 4002805
LOAD 00016 00016 00017 −00011 −00009 −00012
4000415 4000385 4000395 4000435 4000445 4000445
Observations 10,913 10,913 10,913 11,313 11,313 11,313
R-squared 00111 00125 00122 00112 00114 00112
Notes. This table uses OLS regressions to examine the relation between stock performance of management companies and aggregate fund flows into diversified
U.S. equity and bond funds managed by these companies. The dependent variable is family-level new money growth (NMG) in month t . The stock price
performance of management companies is measured using the average market-adjusted returns over the prior 12, 24, and 36 months (CR ). FR is the average
market-adjusted family fund returns over the prior 12, 24, and 36 months. STAR is an indicator variable that takes on unity if the family has at least one member
fund rated as a star fund. Std 0Dev 0CR is the time-series standard deviation of CR . Std 0Dev 0FR is the time-series standard deviation of the fund-specific
performance within a fund family. TNA is the family-level monthly total net assets value. AGE is the TNA-weighted fund age in a family. TO is the TNA-weighted
turnover ratio at the family-level. EXP and LOAD are the TNA-weighted expense ratio and the total load at the family-level. The sample period is from January
1992 to December 2009. Time fixed effects are included. All independent variables are lagged by one month. Standard errors are clustered by management
companies and are reported in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
are also not affected qualitatively if we measure fund
performance using market-adjusted, style-adjusted, or
factor-adjusted returns.
The previous specification estimates the relation
between company performance and fund flows at
the fund level. This specification weights all funds
equally regardless of fund size. Aggregating flows
at the family level generates very similar results, as
reported in Table 4.
The results on both bond and equity mutual funds
indicate that the performance of the parent com-
pany has an economically significant impact on how
clients perceive its mutual fund segment. Mutual
fund investors react to both the performance of the
mutual funds and the performance of the funds’ par-
ent companies.
3.4. Revenue Dependence
A relation between the performance of the manage-
ment company and the activities of the affiliated
mutual funds can occur due to direct and indirect
spillover effects. On the one hand, the performance
of the management company might be a reflection of
the performance of the mutual fund segment. Com-
panies that manage successful mutual funds might
exhibit superior stock price performance because the
stock price capitalizes the value of the mutual fund
sector to the conglomerate. This direct spillover effect
would be particularly pronounced for management
companies where the mutual fund segment accounts
for a large fraction of the company’s revenues. On the
other hand, indirect spillover effects between the var-
ious business segments could affect the money flows
of mutual funds through a branding effect.
To address this question, we repeat the previous
analysis separately for management companies with
low (below median) and high (above median) rev-
enue dependency on the fund management busi-
nesses. As reported in Table 1, the median percentage
share of revenues from equity mutual funds is just
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0.51% of the total revenues of the fund management
companies. The revenue percentage due to equity
funds differs significantly across the two subsamples.
Whereas below-median families generate on average
only 0.20% of their revenues from equity mutual
funds, above-median families generate on average
9.56% of their revenues from the equity mutual funds.
It is unlikely that fund performance has a substan-
tial direct impact on the stock price performance of
management companies with below-median revenue
percentages.
Table 5 shows that the results are similar across
both subsamples. The coefficient estimates on the
prior company performance are not statistically dif-
ferent between the two subsamples at a 5% signifi-
cance level. Thus, our results are not just driven by
Table 5 Equity Fund Flows by Management Company Performance and Fund Performance: Subsamples by Revenue Percentage
Dependent variable: Monthly fund flows (NMG)
12 months 24 months 36 months
Low High Low High Low High
REVPCT REVPCT REVPCT REVPCT REVPCT REVPCT
CR 00073∗∗ 00077∗∗ 00116∗ 00131∗∗ 00085 00144∗
4000355 4000335 4000635 4000585 4000895 4000745
FR 00974∗∗∗ 10041∗∗∗ 10075∗∗∗ 10368∗∗∗ 10091∗∗∗ 10374∗∗∗
4001055 4000775 4001585 4001255 4001715 4001585
FAMFR −00090 00001 −00090 −00123 −00068 −00139
4003005 4001465 4003205 4002135 4003245 4002205
STAR 00016∗∗∗ 00013∗∗∗ 00018∗∗∗ 00013∗∗∗ 00015∗∗∗ 00009∗∗∗
4000035 4000035 4000035 4000035 4000035 4000035
Std.Dev.CR 00008 −00003 00020 00006 00009 00008
4000225 4000165 4000275 4000255 4000335 4000365
Std.Dev.FR −00091∗∗ −00020 −00098∗ −00108∗∗ −00137∗∗ −00149∗∗∗
4000435 4000445 4000535 4000405 4000615 4000395
LOG(TNA) −00002∗∗∗ −00002∗∗∗ −00002∗∗∗ −00003∗∗∗ −00002∗∗∗ −00003∗∗∗
4000015 4000005 4000015 4000005 4000015 4000005
LOG(AGE) −00019∗∗∗ −00009∗∗∗ −00019∗∗∗ −00008∗∗∗ −00019∗∗∗ −00008∗∗∗
4000025 4000015 4000025 4000015 4000025 4000015
TO −00002∗ −00002∗ −00002∗ −00002 −00001 −00002
4000015 4000015 4000015 4000015 4000015 4000015
EXP −00657∗∗∗ −00685∗∗∗ −00847∗∗∗ −00632∗∗∗ −00931∗∗∗ −00628∗∗∗
4002295 4001815 4002365 4001785 4002325 4001845
LOAD 00168∗∗ 00092∗∗ 00156∗∗ 00090∗∗ 00152∗∗ 00093∗∗
4000645 4000405 4000625 4000375 4000625 4000385
Observations 37,875 37,797 37,875 37,797 37,875 37,797
R-squared 00193 00255 00188 00249 00178 00242
Notes. This table uses OLS regressions to examine the relation between stock performance of management companies and fund flows into diversified U.S.
equity funds managed by these companies. The equity funds are partitioned into two groups according to the management company’s revenue dependency
(REVPCT ) in the previous year. REVPCT is the percentage of revenues of the management company that is generated from management of U.S. equity
mutual funds and is computed as the product of the annual management fees multiplied by average family TNA over the 12 months in the year and divided
by total revenues of the management company. The dependent variable is fund-level new money growth (NMG) in month t . The stock price performance of
management companies is measured using the average market-adjusted returns over the prior 12, 24, and 36 months (CR ). FR and FAMFR are the average
market-adjusted fund and fund family returns over the prior 12, 24, and 36 months, respectively. Std 0Dev 0CR and Std 0Dev 0FR are the time-series standard
deviations of CR and FR , respectively. TNA is the total net asset value of a fund. AGE is the fund age. TO is the turnover ratio of a fund. EXP and LOAD are
the expense ratio and the total load of a fund. The sample period is from January 1992 to December 2009. Time fixed effects are included. All independent
variables are lagged by one month. Standard errors are clustered by management companies and are reported in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
companies where the mutual fund business segment
is their main revenue generator.
3.5. Piecewise Linear Specification
To examine whether the company performance–flow
relation is driven primarily by firms with supe-
rior performance or by firms with inferior perfor-
mance, we separately estimate the performance–flow
coefficients for underperforming and outperform-
ing companies and funds. In this specification, we
replace CRf 1 t from Equation (2) with MIN4CRf 1 t105
and MAX4CRf 1 t105 and FR with MIN4FRf 1 t105 and
MAX4FRf 1 t105. The company and fund performances
are measured after adjusting for market returns.
Table 6 reports the results using the signed com-
pany performance measure. Whereas we find a convex
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Table 6 Equity Fund Flows by Management Company Performance:
Piecewise Linear Regressions
Dependent variable: Monthly fund flows (NMG)
12 months 24 months 36 months
MIN(CR, 0) 00097∗∗ 00167∗∗ 00146
4000385 4000695 4001135
MAX(CR, 0) 00070∗ 00127∗∗ 00139∗∗
4000385 4000575 4000655
MIN(FR, 0) 00492∗∗∗ 00425∗∗∗ 00313∗∗
4000605 4000935 4001205
MAX(FR, 0) 10272∗∗∗ 10520∗∗∗ 10574∗∗∗
4000855 4001285 4001385
FAMFR −00384∗∗∗ −00655∗∗∗ −00675∗∗∗
4000965 4001275 4001335
STAR 00012∗∗∗ 00012∗∗∗ 00009∗∗∗
4000015 4000025 4000025
Std.Dev.CR −00001 00012 00012
4000175 4000235 4000275
Std.Dev.FR −00142∗∗∗ −00188∗∗∗ −00220∗∗∗
4000265 4000325 4000365
LOG(TNA) −00001∗∗∗ −00001∗∗∗ −00002∗∗∗
4000005 4000005 4000005
LOG(AGE) −00014∗∗∗ −00013∗∗∗ −00013∗∗∗
4000015 4000015 4000015
TO −00003∗∗∗ −00003∗∗∗ −00003∗∗∗
4000015 4000015 4000015
EXP −00452∗∗∗ −00454∗∗∗ −00450∗∗∗
4001715 4001645 4001665
LOAD 00143∗∗∗ 00138∗∗∗ 00137∗∗∗
4000375 4000365 4000365
Observations 78,061 78,061 78,061
R-squared 00222 00220 00211
Notes. This table uses OLS regressions to examine the relation between stock
performance of management companies and fund flows into diversified U.S.
equity funds managed by these companies. The dependent variable is fund-
level new money growth (NMG) in month t . The stock price performance
of management companies is measured using the average market-adjusted
returns over the prior 12, 24, and 36 months (CR ). FR and FAMFR are the
average market-adjusted fund and fund family returns over the prior 12, 24,
and 36 months, respectively. STAR is an indicator variable that takes on unity
if the fund is rated as a star fund. Std 0Dev 0CR and Std 0Dev 0FR are the time-
series standard deviations of CR and FR , respectively. TNA is the total net
asset value of a fund. AGE is the fund age. TO is the turnover ratio of a fund.
EXP and LOAD are the expense ratio and the total load of a fund. The sam-
ple period is from January 1992 to December 2009. Time fixed effects are
included. All independent variables are lagged by one month. Standard errors
are clustered by management companies and are reported in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
performance–flow relation for fund returns, we find
a close-to-linear performance–flow relation for com-
pany returns. The slope coefficients on the company
performance are not statistically significantly differ-
ent for companies with negative or positive market-
adjusted performance. This differential relation in
second-order effects for company and fund perfor-
mance could be due to the fact that the flows to
mutual funds affiliated with highly performing man-
agement companies are distributed across all funds
within a family, whereas the flows to highly perform-
ing funds are highly concentrated on a small number
of star funds, as documented by Chevalier and Ellison
(1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998).
3.6. Alternative Drivers of Flows
The previous analyses use the stock price perfor-
mance of the management companies as a statistic
that aggregates the economic fundamentals of the
management companies. In Table 7, we use additional
measures to capture the fundamentals of the firm.
Prior company and fund performance are measured
in all specifications using a 24-month window.
Jain and Wu (2000) and Gallaher et al. (2010) show
that advertising has significant effects on investor
flows into mutual funds. Companies that exhibit a
superior stock price performance might increase their
advertising expenditures, which could attract addi-
tional assets to their mutual fund sector. To investi-
gate this mechanism, we control in the first column of
Table 7 for the advertising intensity (i.e., advertising
expenditures divided by net sales of the manage-
ment companies during the previous year using Com-
pustat data). We find a significantly positive impact
of advertising intensity at the management com-
pany level on fund flows. A one-standard-deviation
increase in the advertising intensity increases fund
flows during the next month by 19 basis points.
However, the market-adjusted stock performance of
the management company remains economically and
statistically significant after controlling for advertising
intensity.
Similarly, companies with superior stock market
performance might be able to increase their sales
force, which could generate higher future fund flows.
In the second column of Table 7, we show that
employment growth over the prior year also leads to
an increase in fund flows. However, the stock price
performance of the management company continues
to explain future fund flows to a significant degree.
The next two columns of Table 7 study whether the
impact of company stock performance remains if we
include two measures of the accounting performance
of management companies. The first measure is the
sales growth over the prior year (SG) and the second
measure is the return on equity over the prior year
(ROE). Consistent with our stock performance results,
we find that fund flows also increase with these
accounting measures of firm performance. However,
the results using these accounting measures are eco-
nomically and statistically weaker than the results
using the stock performance. Thus, fund flows are
related to both the prior stock market and the prior
accounting performance of their parent companies.
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Table 7 Equity Fund Flows by Management Company Performance
Controlling for Other Flow Determinants
Dependent variable: Monthly fund flows (NMG)
CR 00094∗∗ 00086∗ 00086∗ 00073∗ 00100∗
4000475 4000515 4000445 4000445 4000575
AI 00106∗∗∗
4000355
EG 00002∗
4000015
SG 00002∗
4000015
ROE 00011∗
4000065
SCANDAL −00004∗
4000035
FR 10257∗∗∗ 10259∗∗∗ 10282∗∗∗ 10282∗∗∗ 10200∗∗∗
4000915 4000945 4000915 4000915 4001065
FAMFR −00133 −00083 −00221 −00223 −00116
4001515 4001585 4001535 4001575 4001935
STAR 00014∗∗∗ 00013∗∗∗ 00012∗∗∗ 00012∗∗∗ 00012∗∗∗
4000025 4000025 4000025 4000025 4000025
Std.Dev.CR 00023 00018 00016 00018 00021
4000205 4000205 4000205 4000215 4000225
Std.Dev.FR −00109∗∗∗ −00101∗∗∗ −00095∗∗∗ −00093∗∗∗ −00100∗∗∗
4000325 4000335 4000325 4000315 4000365
LOG(TNA) −00001∗∗∗ −00001∗∗∗ 00000 −00001 00000
4000005 4000005 4000005 4000005 4000015
LOG(AGE) −00009∗∗∗ −00009∗∗∗ −00007∗∗∗ −00007∗∗∗ −00008∗∗∗
4000015 4000015 4000015 4000015 4000015
TO −00001 −00001 −00001 −00001 −00001
4000015 4000015 4000015 4000015 4000015
EXP −00285∗∗ −00364∗∗ −00303∗ −00333∗∗ −00565∗∗∗
4001395 4001545 4001655 4001645 4001875
LOAD 00088∗∗∗ 00078∗∗∗ 00071∗∗∗ 00069∗∗∗ 00099∗∗∗
4000255 4000275 4000265 4000255 4000315
Observations 73,355 68,489 72,191 73,087 60,825
R-squared 00111 00109 00102 00102 00093
Notes. This table uses OLS regressions to examine the relation between
stock performance of management companies and fund flows into diversi-
fied U.S. equity funds managed by these companies. The dependent variable
is fund-level new money growth (NMG) in month t . The stock price perfor-
mance of management companies is measured using the average industry-
adjusted returns over the prior 24 months (CR ). The specifications con-
trol for advertising intensity (AI), employment growth (EG), sales growth
(SG), return on equity (ROE ), and for an indicator variable that captures
a mutual fund scandal over the previous six months (SCANDAL). FR and
FAMFR are the average market-adjusted fund and fund family returns over
the prior 24 months. STAR is an indicator variable that takes on unity if
the fund is rated as a star fund. Std 0Dev 0CR and Std 0Dev 0FR are the time-
series standard deviations of CR and FR , respectively. TNA is the total net
asset value of a fund. AGE is the fund age. TO is the turnover ratio of a
fund. EXP and LOAD are the expense ratio and the total load of a fund.
The sample period is from January 1992 to December 2009 for the first
four accounting-based measures and is from January 2000 to December
2009 for the specification using the scandal variable. Time fixed effects
are included. All independent variables are lagged by one month. Stan-
dard errors are clustered by management companies and are reported in
parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
Karpoff et al. (2008) show that the reputation penal-
ties imposed by the market following corporate scan-
dals are significant. The mutual fund sector has
experienced a significant scandal early in the 2000s,
as discussed by Houge and Wellman (2005), Qian
(2011), and Potter and Schwarz (2012). Fund investors
might withdraw money from their mutual funds in
response to corporate scandals. This could potentially
explain why there is a positive relation between fund
flows and company performance. The last column of
Table 7 indicates that including an indicator variable
for funds affected by the mutual fund trading scan-
dal does not affect the coefficient on the prior com-
pany performance qualitatively. Thus, our results are
not explained by the mutual fund scandals of the
early 2000s.14
3.7. Fund Names
To investigate the mechanism of the spillover, we sep-
arate the funds into different subsamples in Table 8.
In the first subsample, we classify mutual funds
according to whether the name of the mutual fund
management company corresponds to the name of
the mutual fund. Many fund investors might not
recognize the affiliation between the fund manage-
ment company and the mutual funds if they do
not share the same names. The majority of mutual
funds share the same names as the management
company. We observe a significant relationship only
between company performance and fund flows for
funds that share the name of the management com-
pany. The second subsample separates funds depend-
ing on whether the funds have a low or high name
fluency score based on Green and Jame (2013). We
find stronger spillover effects for funds with short,
easy-to-pronounce names. These results indicate that
our findings are more likely driven by reputational or
brand spillovers and less likely driven by the rational
learning of the investment ability of fund managers.
4. Subsequent Fund Performance
The sensitivity of fund flows to prior manage-
ment company performance could be justified if the
subsequent fund performance is positively predicted
by the prior company performance or if the fund
flows are sufficient to eliminate fund performance
persistence due to decreasing returns to scale as sug-
gested by Berk and Green (2004).15
14 Kisin (2011) and Anton and Polk (2014) use the mutual fund scan-
dals of the early 2000s as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate
the role of fund flows.
15 A related literature has studied the impact of flows on fund
returns. Gruber (1996), Edelen (1999), Zheng (1999), Wermers
(2003), Coval and Stafford (2007), Chen et al. (2008), Zhang (2008),
Frazzini and Lamont (2009), Chen et al. (2010), and Lou (2012) pro-
vide evidence that mutual fund flows are correlated with subse-
quent fund performance.
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Table 8 Equity Fund Flows by Management Company Performance
and Fund Performance by Fund Names and Name Fluency
Dependent variable: Monthly fund flows (NMG)
Fund names Fund name fluency
Family Different Low High
name funds name funds fluency fluency
CR 00090∗∗ 00026 00050 00133∗
4000445 4000565 4000525 4000745
FR 10277∗∗∗ 00958∗∗∗ 10308∗∗∗ 10116∗∗∗
4000875 4002325 4001045 4001365
FAMFR −00202 00249 −00217 −00196
4001535 4002555 4001575 4002055
STAR 00013∗∗∗ 00007∗ 00013∗∗∗ 00018∗∗∗
4000025 4000045 4000025 4000055
Std.Dev.CR 00013 00071∗∗ 00032 00000
4000195 4000325 4000205 4000245
Std.Dev.FR −00119∗∗∗ −00017 −00153∗∗∗ −00113∗∗∗
4000305 4000495 4000355 4000385
LOG(TNA) −00001∗∗ 00001 −00001∗ −00001∗
4000005 4000015 4000005 4000015
LOG(AGE) −00009∗∗∗ −00006∗∗∗ −00009∗∗∗ −00008∗∗∗
4000015 4000025 4000015 4000015
TO −00001∗∗ 00002 −00001∗ −00002∗∗
4000015 4000025 4000015 4000015
EXP −00377∗∗ 00569 −00269 −00799∗∗∗
4001555 4003705 4001845 4002425
LOAD 00090∗∗∗ −00040 00090∗∗∗ 00095∗∗
4000275 4000465 4000335 4000455
Observations 73,242 4,819 45,559 12,599
R-squared 00131 00138 00135 00171
Notes. This table uses OLS regressions to examine the relation between stock
performance of management companies and fund flows into diversified U.S.
equity funds managed by these companies. The equity funds are partitioned
into subsamples based on whether the fund name includes the name of the
management company and based on the fund name fluency following Green
and Jame (2013). The dependent variable is fund-level new money growth
(NMG) in month t . The stock price performance of management compa-
nies is measured using the average market-adjusted returns over the prior
24 months (CR ). FR and FAMFR are the average market-adjusted fund and
fund family returns over the prior 24 months. STAR is an indicator vari-
able that takes on unity if the fund is rated as a star fund. Std 0Dev 0CR and
Std 0Dev 0FR are the time-series standard deviations of CR and FR , respec-
tively. TNA is the total net asset value of a fund. AGE is the fund age. TO is
the turnover ratio of a fund. EXP and LOAD are the expense ratio and the
total load of a fund. The sample period is from January 1992 to December
2009. Time fixed effects are included. All independent variables are lagged
by one month. Standard errors are clustered by management companies and
are reported in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
To study whether past management company
performance predicts future fund performance, we
regress the market-adjusted return of equity funds in
month t on the past company and fund performance
measures and on additional lagged control variables:
FRf 1t = 1CRf 1t−1 +2FRf 1t−1 +3FAMFRf 1t−1
+4STARf 1t−1 +5Std0Dev0CRf 1t−1
+6Std0Dev0FRf 1t−1 +7LOG4TNAf 1t−15
+8LOG4AGEf 1t−15+9TOf 1t−1
+10EXPf 1t−1 +11LOADf 1t−1 +t+f 1t0 (3)
Table 9 shows that the company return predicts fund
returns negatively at horizons exceeding 24 months.
For example, a one-standard-deviation increase in the
company return over the prior 36 months (1.68%)
decreases next month’s return on equity funds by
5.7 basis points. Whereas the impact of company
performance becomes stronger at longer horizons,
the impact of fund performance becomes weaker at
Table 9 Future Equity Fund Performance
Dependent variable:
Next month’s market-adjusted fund return
12 months 24 months 36 months 48 months 60 months
CR 00013 −00019 −00034∗∗∗ −00019∗ −00022∗
4000125 4000125 4000135 4000115 4000135
FR 00180∗∗∗ 00094∗∗∗ 00048∗∗ 00094∗∗∗ 00086∗∗∗
4000165 4000215 4000235 4000225 4000255
FAMFR 00018 −00066∗∗ −00046∗ −00036 −00050∗
4000285 4000295 4000275 4000285 4000295
STAR 00001 00001 00001 00001 00001∗∗
4000015 4000015 4000015 4000015 4000015
Std.Dev.CR 00036∗∗∗ 00048∗∗∗ 00047∗∗∗ 00046∗∗∗ 00044∗∗∗
4000055 4000075 4000075 4000075 4000075
Std.Dev.FR −00035∗∗ −00031∗∗ −00030∗∗ −00029∗∗ −00031∗∗
4000165 4000165 4000145 4000145 4000135
LOG(TNA) −00001∗∗∗ −00001∗∗∗ −00001∗∗∗ −00001∗∗∗ −00001∗∗∗
4000005 4000005 4000005 4000005 4000005
LOG(AGE) 00001∗∗∗ 00001∗∗∗ 00001∗∗∗ 00001∗∗∗ 00001∗∗∗
4000005 4000005 4000005 4000005 4000005
TO 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000
4000005 4000005 4000005 4000005 4000005
EXP −00002 −00018 −00017 −00017 −00015
4000305 4000355 4000375 4000375 4000375
LOAD −00008 −00009 −00008 −00009 −00010
4000065 4000075 4000075 4000065 4000065
Observations 78,061 78,061 78,061 78,061 78,061
R-squared 00696 00694 00694 00694 00694
Notes. This table uses OLS regressions to examine the relation between stock
performance of management companies and next month’s fund performance
by U.S. equity funds managed by these companies. The dependent variable
is the market-adjusted fund return in month t . The stock price performance
of management companies is measured using the average market-adjusted
returns over the prior 12, 24, 36, 48, and 60 months (CR ). FR and FAMFR are
the average market-adjusted fund and fund family returns over the prior 12,
24, 36, 48, and 60 months. STAR is an indicator variable that takes on unity
if the fund is rated as a star fund. Std 0Dev 0CR and Std 0Dev 0FR are the time-
series standard deviations of CR and FR , respectively. TNA is the total net
asset value of a fund. AGE is the fund age. TO is the turnover ratio of a fund.
EXP and LOAD are the expense ratio and the total load of a fund. The sam-
ple period is from January 1992 to December 2009. Time fixed effects are
included. All independent variables are lagged by one month. Standard errors
are clustered by management companies and are reported in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
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longer horizons, confirming the short-term persis-
tence in fund returns documented by Bollen and
Busse (2004).
The negative predictability of fund returns with
long-horizon company returns indicates that the reac-
tion of fund investors to company performance is not
justified. Fund investors are not able to generate supe-
rior future fund performance by investing in funds
managed by companies with superior prior stock price
performance. In fact, the flows to funds managed by
well-performing management companies might actu-
ally be too large, generating poor subsequent perfor-
mance due to diseconomies of scale in fund manage-
ment as suggested by Berk and Green (2004).
Overall, our performance results do not provide
a justification for the substantial inflows into funds
managed by well-performing management compa-
nies and the substantial outflows of funds managed
by poorly performing management companies.
5. Conclusions
We investigate whether there are important spillover
effects across different business segments of publicly
traded firms that also manage mutual funds. We find
that the prior stock price performance of the conglom-
erate has a significant impact on the money flows
of the affiliated mutual funds. Mutual funds man-
aged by poorly performing firms experience unex-
pectedly low flows of new money even if the mutual
funds themselves perform well. Our paper provides
evidence that the performance of mutual fund man-
agement companies has a significant impact on the
fund customers, as measured by mutual fund flows.
In contrast to diversified conglomerates, studying
publicly traded mutual fund management companies
enables us to separately observe the performance of
the mutual fund segment and the stock price per-
formance of the overall diversified company. Thus,
our paper helps us to better understand the industrial
organization of diversified conglomerates.
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